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 utonomous weapons are subject to great controversy. They have been 
defined as weapon systems1 “that can learn or adapt [their] functioning in 
response to changing circumstances in the environment in which [they are] 
deployed.”2 Such systems, once developed, should, through sensors that 
give them situational awareness, be able to identify both legitimate targets 
and hopefully civilians/civilian objects that may potentially suffer incidental 
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effects of attack. Identification would then trigger corresponding action 
through processors or artificial intelligence that would “decide . . . how to 
respond . . . and effectors that carry out those ‘decisions.’”3 Ideally, auton-
omous weapons would select and engage targets without ongoing human 
intervention in an open environment under circumstances which are un-
structured and dynamic. At present, no weapon system possesses such ca-
pabilities. The absence or presence of human intervention is, however, a 
relative distinction, as is the distinction between humans “in,” “on” or “out 
of the loop,” which is therefore not very helpful.4 Despite the system’s au-
tonomy, human beings will inevitably be involved, either in overseeing the 
operation of the weapon, or at least in producing and programming the 
weapon systems. There is agreement that, although these systems do not 
yet exist, they could be developed within twenty years. Many request that 
they be purely, simply and preventively banned, specifically because their 
use would not be consistent with international humanitarian law (IHL).5 
The 117 States parties to the UN Conventional Weapons Convention6 have 
agreed to hold this year a four-day intergovernmental meeting to explore 
questions related to lethal autonomous weapon systems with a view to po-
tentially drafting a Protocol VI to the Convention.7 Even the United States, 
which is among the most technologically advanced States in this field, cur-
rently requires that such weapon systems “be designed to allow command-
ers and operators to exercise appropriate levels of judgment over the use of 
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force,”8 which means that it is not admissible for producers to program 
machines that make final decisions as to targets against which force shall be 
used. 
It is perhaps because I have been confronted in actual armed conflicts 
with so many violations committed by human beings, but inevitably never 
with atrocities by robots9 (although admittedly, they did not exist in the 
armed conflicts I witnessed), that my first feeling is not skepticism, but 
hope for better respect of IHL.10 Only human beings can be inhuman and 
only human beings can deliberately choose not to comply with the rules 
they were instructed to follow. To me, it seems more reasonable to expect 
(and to ensure) a person who devises and constructs an autonomous 
weapon in a peaceful workplace to comply with IHL than a soldier on the 
battlefield or in a hostile environment. A robot cannot hate, cannot fear, 
cannot be hungry or tired and has no survival instinct.11 “Robots do not 
rape.”12 They can sense more information simultaneously and process it 
faster than a human being.13 As the weapons actually delivering kinetic 
force become increasingly quicker and more complex, it may be that hu-
mans become simply too overwhelmed by information and the decisions 
that must be taken to direct them.14 Human beings often kill others to 
avoid being killed themselves. The robot can delay the use of force until 
the last, most appropriate moment, when it has been established that the 
target and the attack are legitimate. Certainly, there may be technical fail-
ures, but all those who drive cars and every traffic policeman know that 
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most accidents are not due to technical, but human, failures (although driv-
ers, unlike soldiers, are usually not seeking to kill or injure).  
As soon as robots have artificial intelligence, one must obviously also 
make sure that such intelligence is not used in the same way as some hu-
man intelligence is used, i.e., to circumvent the rules or to decide—from a 
purely utilitarian perspective—that non-respect of instructions that con-
form to IHL may make it easier to achieve the main objective of overcom-
ing the enemy. In addition, States developing and producing autonomous 
weapon systems must—and will in their own interest—take measures to 
prevent the enemy from tampering with such systems and directing them 
against the producing State and its civilians.15 
It is obviously not up to me as a lawyer to speculate on whether auton-
omous weapons that (a) do not share the same disadvantages of human 
beings fighting wars and (b) are able to function in compliance with the 
principles and rules on distinction, proportionality and precautions as well 
as human beings can be developed. I will nevertheless first highlight this 
technical question which is, in my view, decisive, and one to which I have 
no answer. It is a question to which a definitive answer must be supplied 
before such weapon systems may be used (Part II). Next I will address 
some preliminary issues which either go beyond IHL or are raised by au-
tonomous weapon systems just as they are for other means of warfare (Part 
III). The principal portion of the article will then be devoted to the specific 
problems autonomous weapon systems may raise under IHL and whether 
they may be able to comply—or provide even greater compliance—with 
the core IHL targeting principles of distinction, proportionality and precau-
tions in attack (Part IV). 
 
II. THE CRUCIAL TECHNICAL ISSUE 
 
As explained above, I consider that weapon systems which do not base the 
use of force upon an ad hoc human decision offer the advantage of a 
greater possibility of respecting IHL. However, this presupposes that it is 
technically possible to make them as accurate as an average soldier in terms 
of distinction, proportionality and precautions. The main question remains 
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a technical one:16 is it, or will it one day be, possible to develop a robot able 
to sense information and thereafter to act such that it distinguishes–in the 
same manner as a human being—between legitimate targets, i.e., military 
objectives, combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities on the 
one hand, and those protected by IHL from attacks, i.e., civilians and civil-
ian objects, specially protected objects such as cultural property, objects 
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, medical units, etc., 
on the other? 
Many experts consider that development of robots with that capability 
is impossible given the current technology. I have seen no official pro-
nouncement indicating that it is possible, nor am I aware of anyone sug-
gesting that autonomous weapon systems may be used even if such devel-
opment turns out to be impossible. Governments with the possible ability 
to produce these kinds of weapons indicate that genuinely autonomous 
deployment is not currently envisaged.17 William Boothby, the most re-
nowned weapons law expert I know, and who has a strong military back-
ground, envisages their autonomy, without human supervision, only in very 
limited and predetermined environments.18 It is claimed that no one envis-
ages developing any system “without restrictive engagement parameters, 
such as limiting the area of operation or nature of the target” (even among 
lawful targets).19 It is also true that wars are full of “friction” and unex-
pected situations.20 All this makes me skeptical of whether it will be possi-
ble to create a machine with the necessary contextual intelligence to adapt 
to the great variety of situations which may arise in hostilities. Neverthe-
less, I cannot predict possible future developments. 
That autonomous weapon systems will operate in dynamic and un-
structured circumstances does not mean that those circumstances are un-
foreseeable. An important question I am unable to answer concerns 
whether it is possible to program these weapons to adapt a rule to circum-
stances not foreseen by the programmer, or whether they can only deal 
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with circumstances foreseen by the programmer. If the latter is true, they 
would have to be programmed not to act in other circumstances and/or to 
notify a human being that he/she must make the necessary decision.21 
However, while it may be impossible to program autonomous weapons for 
all circumstances which may appear in an armed conflict, might it be possi-
ble for them to “learn”?22 
It will indeed be a challenge to translate some aspects of IHL—for ex-
ample, the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Hu-
manitarian Law23 or various States’ interpretations of the concept of direct 
participation in hostilities—into a computer program. This is, however, 
necessary. It is not simply an issue of distinguishing between combatants 
and civilians in a Cold War-like situation, but in the real contexts of today’s 
conflicts. In these conflicts, civilians directly participate in hostilities, ren-
dering application of the principle of distinction difficult for average sol-
diers, to say nothing of autonomous weapons. 
Although I don’t know what is technically feasible, if I take a position 
in this article it is primarily because I consider that many objections of 
principle against autonomous weapon systems are either questionable from 
an IHL point of view, or misunderstand IHL and warfare. 
 
III. PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
A. Questions Going Beyond International Humanitarian Law 
 
Many objections against autonomous weapons are situated outside IHL. 
Some are moral. To me, it seems obvious that robots can neither “behave” 
“morally” nor “immorally.”24 While I would never claim that robots can be 
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more humane than humans,25 I am convinced that only human beings can 
be inhuman. Moral judgments are reserved for the human beings creating, 
directing and using weapons.  
 
1.  May Only a Human Being Decide to Kill Another Human Being? 
Many find the very idea that a robot may kill a human being to be horrible. 
One philosopher even claims there is an implicit requirement in IHL for a 
human decision to kill a person.26 Others wonder whether it is “inherently 
wrong to let autonomous machines decide who and when to kill.”27 How-
ever, if this were true, all mines would be prohibited, as well as all weapons 
such as missiles that can be directed at a military objective and combatants, 
but which do not allow the operator to know who exactly will be killed. 
Moreover, today computers already open the bomb bays of bomber air-
craft or decide which targets to engage in the case of the Aegis naval de-
fense system when used in the automatic mode.28 If the moral requirement 
of human involvement simply means that a human being must decide what 
categories of people can be targeted, autonomous weapons, as I understand 
them, comply because they are programmed by human beings. Sometimes 
this requirement of human involvement is justified by referring to the re-
quirement under Article I of the Hague Regulations29 that a combatant 
must be commanded by a person.30 I am, however, not aware of anyone 
suggesting that robots would instruct and supervise humans. 
In addition, to be lawful31 autonomous weapons must still be subject to 
general instructions given to them by humans. The weapon system would 
simply apply those instructions autonomously to a given situation.  
Beyond that, is it not as horrible to imagine one human being deliber-
ately killing another in the absence of an immediate threat from the latter 
as it is to imagine a machine doing the same? But this horror is war where 
killing in the absence of a threat is lawful.  
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It would be a misconception of existing IHL to claim that the decision 
to kill someone in an armed conflict must be taken after a value judgment 
(which a machine is obviously unable to make and must be made by a hu-
man being) is made about that person. Whether a person may be targeted 
in an armed conflict is dependent on their status (combatant/civilian) 
and/or the objective impression resulting from their conduct (direct partic-
ipation in hostilities) and not whether that person is innocent or guilty of a 
crime. What counts, for example, is, not whether a person wants to surren-
der, but whether he or she indicates their willingness to surrender and the 
attacker becomes aware of this indication. 
 
2. Do They Make it Easier to Go to War? 
Some fear that autonomous weapon systems make it easier for a country to 
go to war and to use force beyond its borders because it no longer risks the 
lives of its own soldiers, but only those of civilians on the opposing side.32 
This risk is partly mitigated by the fact that it is highly improbable that one 
side would fight a war only with robots.33 Additionally, conflict has moved 
beyond fighting between the knights or samurai of the Middle Ages; today 
many weapons and delivery system technologies permit cross-border at-
tacks. This risk must be countered by ius ad bellum and disarmament.  
Importantly, the very decision to engage in an armed conflict must be 
reserved for humans.34 It is true that the motivation for a State to comply 
with ius ad bellum could be lowered if it could expect that only combatants 
and civilians suffering incidental effects of the enemy will be affected. 
However, nothing in the law would hinder the opposing side from attack-
ing the human beings—combatants and civilians—who deploy the robots.  
Rules of IHL have long been criticized for attempting to “humanize” 
war, making it more conceivable and more acceptable. War must be horri-
ble—and horrible for both sides—to deter States and human beings from 
resort to it. If this line of argument worked in reality, war would have dis-
appeared; unfortunately it has not. Beyond that, it may well be that the 
possibility of secrecy in the use of autonomous weapons and the resulting 
difficulties of attribution make the implementation of State responsibility 
and of international criminal responsibility for an act of aggression more 
                                                                                                                      
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4, 39; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 58; Alston, 
supra note 11, ¶ 44; Asaro, supra note 5, at 692. 
33. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 241. 












difficult. On the other hand, the fact that computer systems register every-
thing—or could be programmed to do so—would make an inquiry leading 
to accountability easier.35  
 
3. Unfairness? 
A related concern is that the use of autonomous weapons against an enemy 
not possessing them itself would be unfair, inter alia, because it would not 
involve any risk for the personnel of the attacker, while the defender would 
have to fight with actual human beings who would be killed. This would 
include not only combatants, but also civilians as incidental victims of a 
lawful attack even if IHL is respected. This is, however, a misconception of 
existing IHL. For a long time war has not been fair in this sense.36 The idea 
that two knights fight against each other and all civilians stand by wonder-
ing who will win belongs to the past. No one suggests that a party may not 
use its air force or navy if the enemy has no air force or navy, or has no 
weapons to combat aircraft. As for the unfairness, contemporary reality 
shows that the technologically weaker side may prevail over the stronger 
belligerent and impose its political will over the latter. Some claim that the 
weaker side tries to compensate for its technological deficit by neglecting 
some of the rules according to which it should fight.37 It is difficult, how-
ever, to argue that under IHL this risk prevents a party from using tech-
nology not available to the enemy. 
 
4. The Risk of Proliferation 
As with all weapons, there is obviously a risk of proliferation, and those 
developing autonomous weapons are well advised to take that into account. 
This risk has an aspect specific to autonomous weapons; a risk which is the 
downside to one of their main advantages. I mentioned above that auton-
omous weapon systems will not violate IHL if they were programmed to 
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respect it. They could even be programmed to refuse orders that violate the 
law. The downside of this absolute “discipline” is that if autonomous 
weapons fall into the hands of a ruthless leader able to program them, they 
will never abandon his or her cause as soldiers might because the pro-
grammed robots will be unable to come to the conclusion that it is unjust, 
even when there are repeated and widespread violations of IHL.38 This may 
indicate that a legal framework on the production, stockpiling and transfer 
of autonomous weapons may be necessary. It may be possible to make sure 
that they are automatically deactivated if they fall into the wrong hands or 
receive instructions contrary to IHL.  
 
5. The Risk of a “Gameboy Mentality” of the Producer? 
Some argue that those who build an autonomous weapon and program it 
(imagine, for example, a programmer in New Jersey who is the last human 
being in the loop able to make targeting-relevant decisions, but who has no 
knowledge of where and in what circumstances the weapon is to be used) 
are psychologically less committed, feel a greater distance from and less 
responsibility for use of the weapon system, and will therefore more easily 
adopt a “computer game mentality” than a soldier who is actually on the 
battlefield among the human beings he or she will kill.39 As far as I know, 
there is no scientific evidence to support this (or the opposing) opinion. In 
my experience during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, I met people 
who killed other people face-to-face, and who displayed no more inhibition 
than my son would in a computer game. I am not so sure that the produc-
ers and programmers in New Jersey would see the world simply as a com-
puter game if they were adequately trained, supervised and subject to ap-
propriate accountability systems. In a peacetime activity in which human 
life is at stake, an increasing number of processes are automated and no 
one claims that those who devise such processes comport themselves as 
though they were playing a computer game. No one requires that those 
who produce medical robots work in a hospital and surgery room envi-
ronment. Similarly, those who produce aircraft parts know that people’s 
lives are at risk if they make mistakes, even if they see neither the passen-
gers nor the aircraft.  
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6. Lack of Emotions 
A related objection is that robots lack “human emotions and the capacity 
for compassion.”40 This is true. In response, however, the human beings 
programming the robots hopefully have compassion and there is no reason 
why they should have less of it than a soldier in midst of the battle. Second, 
I have noticed among those who actually fight armed conflicts at least as 
many negative emotions as the positive emotions this argument envisages.41 
Third, IHL does not seek to promote “love,” “mercy”42 or “human empa-
thy”43 (a robot is indeed unable to have such feelings), but respect based 
upon objective criteria. A soldier may not kill a civilian even if there are 
good reasons to hate him or her, while he or she may kill a combatant even 
if that combatant is very nice. If “human empathy” was decisive in war, 
few combatants would be killed, war would finally disappear and only cases 
of peacetime self-defense and defense of others would persist. 
B. International Humanitarian Law Issues which are not Specific to Autonomous 
Weapons 
 
When robots are used certain fundamental questions of IHL may become 
even more important than would be the case if other means of warfare 
were employed. However, the answer to those questions remains contro-
versial. The first question is always what is an armed conflict? We know 
that there is no unique definition. The questions are rather: what is an in-
ternational armed conflict and what is a non-international armed conflict? 
What is the threshold of violence necessary to make violence between a 
State and a non-State actor (or between non-State actors) an armed con-
flict?  
Those questions are not specific to robots and even when autonomous 
weapons are used, the answers must be given—and will perforce be giv-
en—by human beings. The answers simply become even more important 
when autonomous weapons are used. Indeed, outside an armed conflict, 
lethal robots could only be used if they were able to arrest a person, which 
is, as opposed to the use of lethal force, always the solution preferred by 
human rights law. The deployment of autonomous weapons produced for 
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armed conflicts will be unlawful outside armed conflicts. Soldiers, on the 
other hand, can be more easily sent, for example, to ensure security at a 
football match. One might obviously imagine programming an autono-
mous weapon equally capable of distinguishing between hostilities and law 
enforcement operations and applying human rights law to the latter. How-
ever, this will be an extremely difficult task. Under human rights law, for 
example, alternatives to the use of lethal force must be evaluated and the 
risk the target presents to human life must be assessed. 
Many other questions must find an answer before an autonomous 
weapon can be programmed. What is the relationship between internation-
al human rights law and IHL? What is the geographical scope of applica-
tion of IHL, that is, the scope of the battlefield? Autonomous weapons 
raise this latter question more acutely, but, legally, the answer must be the 
same as for an aerial bombardment. May a belligerent attack a target which 
would be a legitimate target under IHL at a location far distant from the 
actual fighting, restrained only by the rules of IHL? In such circumstances, 
does IHL apply at all, but, if so, does international human rights law prevail 
as the lex specialis? Whether drones, missiles or autonomous weapons are 
used, the answer must be the same, and however intelligent an autonomous 
weapon may be, I cannot imagine that it can provide the answer itself. The 
geographical scope of the field of operation of an autonomous weapon and 
the circumstances under which it may use force according to its IHL pro-
gram must be defined by human beings. 
 
IV. SPECIFIC IHL ISSUES 
A. How to Compare the Performance of Robots with that of Human Beings? 
 
1. For a Given Attack 
There is widespread agreement that the ability to use autonomous weapons 
in compliance with IHL should not be evaluated against a hypothetical ide-
al, but instead the comparison should be to human beings.44 This is particu-
larly true for the question of whether a precautionary measure is feasible, as 
only feasible precautions must be taken under IHL.45 What counts, at a 
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minimum, is obviously not whether the precaution is feasible for the robot, 
but whether it would be feasible for a State employing human soldiers, i.e., 
whether it would be feasible for a person. If it is technically not feasible to 
respect certain requirements of IHL with autonomous weapons, this is not 
a sufficient reason for abandoning those requirements. The use of an au-
tonomous weapon in such cases is simply unlawful. Human Rights Watch 
is correct in warning that once autonomous weapons are developed their 
mere availability and military capabilities should never be considered to 
mean that there is a “military necessity” to use them, even if they are not as 
able as a human being to comply with IHL in a given attack.46 This is simp-
ly not the meaning of the principle of military necessity as a prohibitive rule 
in IHL.47 Conversely, if autonomous systems are better than human beings, 
such as in taking precautions, and a State and a commander have them in 
their arsenal and don’t need to reserve their use for other militarily more 
important tasks or tasks involving higher risks for civilians, they must use 
them. 
The bold statement that autonomous weapons may only be used if and 
where they are as good as human beings in complying with IHL is, howev-
er, subject to two nuances. First, artillery and missiles are not—in the same 
manner as a sniper—able to cancel or suspend an attack at the last moment 
based on changing circumstances.48 Nevertheless, no one claims that such 
weapons are inherently unlawful. What counts is that either the system it-
self through technical means, or the human beings using it, are able to ac-
quire information indicating that the attack must be interrupted and either 
the machine or its human operators are able to react to such information.  
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Second, it may well be that the average soldier is better able to respect 
certain aspects of IHL than an autonomous weapon, while such a weapon 
is better in other respects. The question then arises whether a consolidated 
assessment of advantages and disadvantages is admissible or whether an 
autonomous weapon must be as good as an average soldier with respect to 
every rule of IHL. In my view, the choice of means is always based upon a 
consolidated assessment, but such assessment must be made for every at-
tack. It is not sufficient that when compared with alternatives in most, 
normal or ideal circumstances a weapon minimizes incidental civilian loss-
es. An autonomous weapon would have to make such a determination in 
relation to the specific circumstances of each attack, and indicate, if neces-
sary, that it cannot execute that attack, but that the attack must, if it is to be 
carried out, be executed by a human being.  
 
2. When the Autonomous Weapon is Reviewed 
In addition, an in abstracto assessment of all possible uses is equally neces-
sary to determine whether the autonomous weapon concerned may be 
produced in the first place. Article 36 of Protocol Additional I prescribes:  
 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of interna-
tional law applicable to the High Contracting Party.  
 
Several States, including the United States which is not a party to Protocol 
I, have implemented this requirement through specific procedures.49 Be-
cause it is implicit in its substantive obligations—“[t]he faithful and re-
sponsible application [of which] would require a State to ensure that the 
new weapons, means and methods of warfare it develops or acquires will 
not violate these obligations,”50—the ICRC considers that this obligation 
binds all States. The establishment of an international body monitoring 
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weapons development would obviously be highly desirable,51 but secrecy 
concerns are a barrier.52 
It is obvious that before autonomous weapons may be deployed, such 
an assessment must be made.53 It may be that “reviews should take place at 
the stage of the conception/design of the weapon, and thereafter at the 
stages of its technological development (development of prototypes and 
testing), and in any case before entering into the production contract.”54 
However, an evaluation is only possible once the technical capabilities of a 
weapon are known, which is not the case at present.55 Admittedly, there is a 
risk that once the technology has been developed at great expense vested 
interests will make it nearly impossible politically to conclude that the result 
is unlawful. The solution may be to accompany the development process 
with constant reviews. In addition, one has to make sure that as much ef-
fort is invested in developing the weapon’s capacity to respect IHL as in its 
lethal capacity, including the development of safeguards against technical 
and communication errors.56 Fortunately, to be accurate and to sense and 
process as much information as possible is both a military and a humanitar-
ian imperative. As for the actual testing, it is obviously only useful if it can 
be excluded that autonomous weapons will act unpredictably in unforeseen 
circumstances,57 but here again my technical assumption is that machines 
act according to algorithms and, therefore, according to a plan established 
by humans, even if that plan instructs them to adapt in a certain way to cer-
tain circumstances. 
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B. Machines are not Bound by International Humanitarian Law: Problems of 
Attribution and of Accountability 
 
1. Only Humans are Responsible 
Only human beings are subject to legal rules. In the case of autonomous 
weapons, IHL is addressed to those human beings who devise, produce 
and program them, as well as those who decide upon their use.58 I reject 
the idea that IHL is inadequate to regulate autonomous weapons because 
they would be situated somewhere between weapon systems and combat-
ants, and further reject the suggestion that a new category with new rules 
should be created to regulate them.59 The difference between a weapon sys-
tem and a human being is not quantitative but qualitative; the two are not 
situated on a sliding scale, but on different levels—subjects and objects. A 
combatant is a human being, only he or she is an addressee of legal obliga-
tions. However far we go into the future and no matter how artificial intel-
ligence will work, there will always be a human being at the starting point.60 
In my understanding, an autonomous weapon system will always operate 
within the limits of its software; software designed by humans.61 It is the 
human being who will decide whether a machine will be created and who 
will create it. Even if one day robots construct other robots, there will still 
be the need for a human being to develop the first robot and instruct it as 
to how to construct new robots. This human being is bound by the law; 
the machine is not bound by the law.  
Human Rights Watch writes that it would be unclear who would be 
held accountable for unlawful actions a robot commits: “Options include 
the military commander that deployed it, the programmer, the manufactur-
er, and the robot itself, but all are unsatisfactory. It would be difficult and 
arguably unfair to hold the first three actors liable and the actor that actual-
ly committed the crime—the robot—would not be punishable.”62 I agree 
with the last part of this statement and I find some suggestions that robots 
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could be scrapped or disabled as a kind of punishment absurd.63 As for the 
first options, it is as fair to hold a commander of a robot accountable as it 
would be to hold accountable a commander who instructs a pilot to bomb 
a target he describes as a military headquarters, but which turns out to be a 
kindergarten. It is obvious that a commander deploying autonomous 
weapons must understand how they function, just as for any other means 
and method of warfare. In my view, the responsibility of such a command-
er is not a case of—nor is it analogous to—command responsibility,64 but a 
case of direct responsibility, just as that of a soldier firing a mortar believ-
ing that it can land only on the targeted tank, but which will kill civilians he 
knows are following the tank. This is a question of the mens rea, intent and 
recklessness with which criminal lawyers are familiar, just as it is for a sur-
geon using a medical robot or, for that matter, prescribing a medicine. 
Based on their Protocol I, Article 36 assessment, States deploying robots 
must give military commanders and operators clear instructions as to when 
and under what circumstances the robots may be actually be used. The op-
erator need not understand the complex programming of the robot,65 but 
must understand the result, that is, what the robot is able and unable to 
do.66 As for the manufacturer and the programmer, domestic criminal laws 
often hold criminally responsible those who deliberately, recklessly or neg-
ligently construct defective buildings or machines that lead to the loss of 
human life.67 I do not think that the possession of autonomous decision- 
making capacity breaks the causal chain allowing attribution and responsi-
bility,68 because I assume that it is always humans who define how this au-
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tonomy will function. This implies the need for drafting specific standards 
of due diligence for both manufacturers and commanders. 
The further question of whether a robot could distinguish lawful from 
unlawful orders69 is equivalent to that of whether they are able to apply 
rules to a complex situation without human intervention. If they cannot, 
they may not be used. If they can, it will be easy to program them not to 
follow unlawful orders.70 None of the reasons for which soldiers often 
obey unlawful orders apply to them. 
 
2. The Problem of the Temporal Field of Application 
The discussion above may raise problems concerning the temporal field of 
application of IHL, as many of those last human interventions—including 
development of an IHL compliant program instructing the autonomous 
weapon when to use lethal force—may occur before an armed conflict ex-
ists. In terms of criminal accountability, war crimes can only be committed 
in armed conflicts, thus raising the question of whether pre-conflict con-
duct is governed by IHL. I would suggest that IHL applies to all conduct 
of a State aimed at having effects during an armed conflict. But, in any 
event, a State using a weapon which was programmed in peacetime not to 
comply with IHL has not taken all feasible precautionary measures in war-
time to avoid incidental civilian losses.  
For criminal responsibility, the issue is trickier. It might be possible to 
treat the person who intentionally programs a system, which is used in 
good faith by an operator during an armed conflict, not to comply with 
IHL to be the indirect perpetrator of the war crime committed during the 
conflict. Another option would be to consider the programmer as a guaran-
tor who is obliged to intervene in wartime to avoid the commission of vio-
lations of IHL, thus committing a war crime by omission if he or she does 
not intervene. Obviously, if the operator is conscious of the defect of the 
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3. Technology Increases Transparency 
On the other hand, technology possessed by autonomous weapons enables 
more precise reconstructions of events for criminal inquiries, although un-
der IHL, in contrast to human rights law, there is no “mandatory ex-post 
facto review of all footage in cases of lethal use, regardless of the status of 
the individual killed.”72 If an inquiry is necessary under the obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed war crimes,73 an electronic 
record will facilitate accountability.74 This presupposes that producers must 
program robots to record such information. 
 
4. May Robots “Go Rogue”? 
A further technical question arising in this context is whether there is a risk 
of an autonomous weapons “going rogue.” Might a weapon one day have 
the technical ability, either of its own “will” or as a result of system imper-
fections, to override its programs and instructions and start “deciding” in a 
truly autonomous manner to violate IHL? A philosopher quoted by Hu-
man Rights Watch writes, “[T]the possibility that an autonomous system 
will make choices other than those predicted and encouraged by its pro-
grammers is inherent in the claim that it is autonomous.”75 I understand 
“autonomy,” however, as including equally autonomous decisions within a 
framework the robot is unable to override. If my understanding is correct, 
it would not be unfair to hold the developer of the weapon responsible for 
such a design flaw. The risk that the robot “goes rogue” must be avoided 
in the way the robot is devised. If this is not possible, such weapons must 
be outlawed. The entire implementation and accountability system of in-
ternational law—as with all law—is exclusively addressed to humans. Ac-
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countability mechanisms and sanctions directly addressed to machines are 
absurd, because machines are not capable of moral choice. 
C. Are Distinction and Proportionality Evaluations Based upon Rational Deci-
sions or Subjective Judgments? 
 
1. Difficulties in Discrimination and Distinction 
Concerning discrimination and distinction, advanced technology still re-
mains to be developed before a robot can distinguish as well as a human 
being between legitimate and unlawful targets. The problem is not only the 
technological inadequacy of sensors, but also of translating IHL into a 
computer language.76 Human beings may make a lot of mistakes; even 
more mistakes than a machine would have technical failures. Nevertheless, 
there are many elements that make a human being understand what is/is 
not a legitimate target, and those factors must be reproduced in a computer 
program. A robot must be able to sense all the necessary information in 
order to distinguish between targets in the same manner as a person. A “ci-
vilian with a large piece of metal in his hands” must obviously be distin-
guished from “a combatant with a rifle in plain clothes.”77 It may be partic-
ularly difficult to automate the indicators that convince a human being a 
certain person belongs to a category (combatants; possibly members of an 
organized armed group who assume a continuous combat function) or is 
engaged in conduct (direct participation in hostilities) which makes them a 
legitimate target.78 Pending revolutionary technological innovations, this 
problem may be solved by allowing a weapon system to target autono-
mously only those categories of objects that are, without question, targeta-
ble.79 It is suggested, therefore, that autonomous weapon systems incapable 
of distinguishing meaningfully may be used in an environment where no 
civilians could be endangered.80 However, this solution does not fully work 
when persons are targets, as anyone may surrender making it unlawful (and 
militarily unnecessary) to target them.  
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As for objects, the definition of a military objective depends on its “ef-
fective contribution to military action” and the “definite military ad-
vantage” the attack offers “in the circumstances ruling at the time.”81 These 
requirements imply a need to be aware of plans and the overall develop-
ment of a military operation. An autonomous weapon system could there-
fore not be allowed to remain fully autonomous over time without receiv-
ing a constant update on those elements, which determine whether an ob-
ject may be targeted. 
It will be equally difficult to formalize factors which convince a human 
being that he or she must cancel or suspend an attack because the target is 
not lawful. For a machine to autonomously make such decisions may be 
even more difficult because the enemy could feign those indicators which 
cause the robot determine that it is confronted with a legitimate target. As 
for the reverse situation, that is, the enemy artificially fulfills the indicators 
which make a robot calculate that it may not attack under IHL, the fasci-
nating question arises as to whether a machine can be “led to believe” 
something, or whether it is possible to “invite the confidence” of a ma-
chinetwo elements of the prohibited act of perfidy.82  
Another issue of distinction is that an autonomous weapon must be 
able to recognize when a legitimate human target surrenders or is wounded 
and abstaining from any act of hostility.83 Beyond that, distinction has, in 
any case, become a very difficult task in counterinsurgency warfare for 
both machines and human beings. I simply do not see any reason of prin-
ciple why a machine could never become better at fulfilling this task than a 
human being. Admittedly, however, as long as the necessary technology 
does not exist, human beings must be involved in the process.84 
 
2. Difficulties in Determining who Directly Participates in Hostilities 
It is unfortunately still controversial as to exactly what constitutes direct 
participation in hostilities. The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance has suggested an 
understanding which, as mentioned previously, will be difficult to translate 
into instructions for a machine. The rule suggested by some critics of the 
Interpretive Guidance, that is, to make any member of an armed group tar-
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getable,85 will be equally difficult to translate because neither a machine nor 
a human being can determine whether an unknown person is a member of 
an organization. It is, however, certainly not necessary “to interpret inten-
tions and emotions” in making that determination,86 which would be an 
unrealistic criterion for both robots and soldiers when confronted with an 
enemy who is not in their control. In any case, if a robot has to be pro-
grammed, it cannot be instructed that “it all depends” or to “use reasona-
ble judgment,” or, in other words, to be programmed that the appropriate 
action depends on the given situation without clarifying what action should 
be undertaken in which situation. In writing a computer program on the 
factors on which the targeting decision depends and how those factors can 
be determined, clarity will be required. 
The definition of direct participation in hostilities raises another prob-
lem in connection with autonomous weapons. According to the Interpretive 
Guidance, the direct causation of harm, which is one of the requirements for 
an act to constitute direct participation in hostilities, “should be understood 
as meaning that the harm in question must be brought about in one causal 
step.”87 Obviously only human steps can count (because the concept of 
direct participation defines who and not what may be targeted). Therefore, 
if autonomous weapons are used, the last causal human step leading to the 
harm caused may be geographically and temporally removed from the ef-
fect. The human being performing this step must be considered as directly 
participating in hostilities. In addition, the Interpretive Guidance correctly re-
calls: 
 
The required standard of direct causation of harm must take into account 
the collective nature and complexity of contemporary military operations. 
For example, attacks carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles may simul-
taneously involve a number of persons . . . . While all of these persons are 
integral to that operation and directly participate in hostilities, only a few 
of them carry out activities that, in isolation, could be said to directly 
cause the required threshold of harm. The standard of direct causation 
must therefore be interpreted to include conduct that causes harm only in 
conjunction with other acts. More precisely, where a specific act does not 
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on its own directly cause the required threshold of harm, the requirement 
of direct causation would still be fulfilled where the act constitutes an in-
tegral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly 
causes such harm.88  
 
This interpretation must probably be even wider in cases involving the 
use of autonomous weapons than in cases, such as the one provided by the 
ICRC in this example, where human-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles 
are used.89 In addition, while direct participation in hostilities does not, in 
my view, constitute a violation of IHL, IHL inherently requires that States 
only use combatants to directly participate in hostilities.90 This implies that 
States must entrust to members of their armed forces the last human inter-
vention in the determination of respect or non-respect for the principles of 
distinction, proportionality and precaution. By requiring this determination 
to be made by soldiers, it should facilitate training, supervision and ac-
countability. 
 
3. Difficulties in Applying the Principle of Military Necessity 
As for the evaluation of military necessity, both soldiers and those who 
program autonomous weapons have to deal with the controversial issue of 
whether or not this principle involves an obligation to capture—rather than 
kill—legitimate targets.91 For the same reasons discussed below with regard 
to the proportionality evaluation, I am not convinced that a human being is 
always better at making this decision, and that a robot is inherently incapa-
ble of “determin[ing] whether an intruder it shot once was merely knocked 
to the ground by the blast, faking an injury, slightly wounded but able to be 
detained with quick action, or wounded seriously enough to no longer pose 
a threat.”92 
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4. Difficulties in Translating the Proportionality Principle into a 
Computer Program 
The need to translate the proportionality principle into a computer pro-
gram for autonomous weapons may present an opportunity to improve 
objectivity. This principle, which is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol 
I, prohibits attacks, even if directed at a military objective, if they “may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Despite 
the qualities the rule ascribes to military advantage, it is very difficult to 
conceptualize. Comparing military advantage anticipated against expected 
civilian losses is a process riddled with inevitably subjective value judg-
ments, especially if there is not an absolute certainty that the advantage 
gained outweighs the effects on the civilian population, but, instead, the 
judgment is less certain. It might, however, be possible to identify, with the 
help of both military and humanitarian experts, indicators and criteria to 
evaluate proportionality, and to make the implied judgment slightly more 
objective. So far, such suggestions have been rejected by military lawyers 
who insisted that evaluations on the matter are dependent on the circum-
stances of particular situations and the good faith of military command-
ers.93 A machine, however, needs clear criteria and a formula to calculate 
proportionality. The need to program autonomous weapons to respect 
proportionality (assuming in the first place that they are technically capable 
of acquiring, through sensors, the information necessary to apply the prin-
ciple) may have the advantage of obliging States to agree on how exactly 
proportionality must be calculated and also on which parameters influence 
this calculation. 
In my view, the greatest difficulty an autonomous weapon system will 
have in applying the proportionality principle is not linked to the evaluation 
of the risks for civilians and civilian objects, but to the evaluation of the 
military advantage anticipated.94 I could imagine a robot gathering the nec-
essary information to evaluate risks to civilians and even to proceed to the 
necessary evaluation if objective formulas are adopted. However, the “con-
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crete and direct military advantage anticipated”95 from an attack on a legit-
imate target constantly changes according to the plans of the commander 
and the development of military operations on both sides. Except where 
no, or clearly negligible, effects upon civilians can be anticipated, a ma-
chine, even if perfectly programmed, could, therefore, not be left to apply 
the proportionality principle unless constantly updated about military oper-
ations and plans. This is in my view the most serious IHL argument against 
the even theoretical possibility of deploying weapons that remain fully au-
tonomous over considerable periods of time.  
 
5. Must Targeting Decisions be Subjective? 
Everything discussed thus far implies that there are considerable challenges 
for developers of autonomous weapons, and I am not sure they will be ev-
er able to overcome them. Critics object for reasons of principle, however, 
that should those challenges be overcome, autonomous weapons would 
still violate IHL because “[e]ven if the development of fully autonomous 
weapons with humanlike cognition became feasible, they would lack certain 
human qualities, such as emotion, compassion, and the ability to under-
stand humans.”96 Their main objection to the theoretical possibility that a 
robot could distinguish between targets and make proportionality evalua-
tions in a more objective and reliable way than a human being is that those 
rules involve subjective judgments,97 which can indeed only be made by 
human beings. I would agree that a machine could never evaluate whether 
a witness in a trial is reliable. The question is simply whether targeting deci-
sions are subjective. Many individuals in the military apparently agree that 
such decisions are subjective when they reject—the discussion on autono-
mous weapons aside—very detailed rules on proportionality, precautions 
and what constitutes direct participation in hostilities. I agree that “justice 
cannot be autonomous.”98 To target a person is, however, definitely not to 
render justice or more precisely, it is not a determination that the person 
deserves the death penalty, but involves exclusively a categorization of the 
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person (as a combatant) or their conduct (direct participation in hostilities) 
without any determination of fault or culpability.  
Human Rights Watch gives the following example: “Distinguishing be-
tween a fearful civilian and a threatening enemy combatant requires a sol-
dier to understand the intentions behind a human’s actions, something a 
robot could not do.”99 I agree only with the last part of the sentence, while 
the remainder misconstrues IHL.100 Even a human being engaged in hostili-
ties will never know, and is not required to inquire into, the intent of an-
other human being, but instead will be receptive only to objective indica-
tions of the danger a person represents.101 In the example, no one would 
criticize a soldier who fired upon a civilian who points, out of fear, a weap-
on at him or her.  
A second example given by Human Rights Watch raises more serious 
questions. “[A] frightened mother may run after her two children and yell 
at them to stop playing with toy guns near a soldier.” Human Rights Watch 
is certain that “[a] human soldier could identify with the mother’s fear and 
the children’s game and thus recognize their intentions.”102 First, I am not 
so sure that in some of today’s fighting environments, where there are child 
soldiers, fanaticized mothers, and differences in language and culture be-
tween soldiers and local populations, a human soldier would always be able 
to easily identify what was happening in such a situation. Second, what the 
soldier must determine is not the intent of the children (becoming a kind 
of child psychologist), but the objective risk of harm to him, his comrades 
and his mission, based upon objective indicators. Even if the mother was 
inciting the children to hate and the children were crying out in hate and 
subjectively willing to kill the soldier, the latter could not fire if it was ap-
parent that the pistols were toy guns. Conversely, if the children simply 
wanted to play, but fired live ammunition as part of their game, the soldier 
could use force. Third, the example nevertheless shows how difficult devis-
ing an autonomous weapon capable of replacing a soldier in all circum-
stances will be.  
                                                                                                                      
99. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 55. 
100. It is not surprising that Human Rights Watch references writings by a philoso-
pher and a computer scientist, not those of a lawyer, to support this proposition. HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 31. 
101. International Committee of the Red Cross, Fifth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Di-
rect Participation in Hostilities: Summary Report  37, 42, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 5–6, 2008 (May 9, 
2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2008-05-report-dph-2008-
icrc.pdf. 












It is true that “common sense,” meaning the ability to make a sound 
practical evaluation of social situations, is based upon human experience. It 
would be particularly difficult to create a machine to reproduce this,103 but 
herein could lay an opportunity to create “objective common sense” based, 
not upon the life history of one individual, but of several persons—ideally 
of mankind. I do not consider that autonomous weapons would only be 
lawful if they could demonstrate omniscience, but only if they can, on aver-
age, do a better job than an average soldier.  
As for the proportionality rule, several authors and military manuals in-
dicate that its application involves a subjective determination.104 The ques-
tion is, however, whether this is simply a description of the unfortunate 
reality, while recognizing that the determination should ideally be as objec-
tive as possible, or whether this is a normative proposition that the deter-
mination should be subjective. I admit that States have not yet been able to 
quantify how the risk of losing one civilian life compares with the potential 
of gaining a certain military advantage, nor what relation between the risk 
and the advantage would be excessive. I think, however, that both for hu-
man operators and for autonomous weapons it would be desirable if a 
formula for such a calculation, together with indicators of the elements that 
should/should not be taken into account, could be agreed upon.  
Obviously, the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis 
(and modeling and determining indicators for the infinite variety of possi-
ble situations will be a perhaps insurmountable difficulty for producers of 
genuinely autonomous weapons105), but I do not see why it should be “sub-
jective.”106  According to one definition, subjective means  
 
relating to the way a person experiences things in his or her own mind; 
based on feelings or opinions rather than facts; . . . a characteristic of or 
belonging to reality as perceived rather than as independent of mind; re-
lating to or being experience or knowledge as conditioned by personal 
mental characteristics or states; peculiar to a particular individual; modi-
fied or affected by personal views, experience or background . . .; arising 
from conditions within the brain or sense organs and not directly caused 
by external stimuli . . . .107  
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But why should a certain civilian be better protected under the law from 
incidental effects arising from an attack by one soldier than by another sol-
dier? Why should the soldier’s youth, education, values, religion or ethics 
matter at all? Should not the only consideration be the military advantage 
to be gained and the incidental effect upon civilians?  
When the ICRC Commentary states that a commander must use “com-
mon sense and good faith,”108 this does not, in my view, mean that the de-
cision must be subjective. Taking the wide latitude of possible common 
sense evaluations into account, I would clearly prefer more precise criteria 
upon which to base decisions. I would not exclude robots from making 
such evaluations simply because they would do so in a necessarily objective 
way. Similarly, in my view, the International Criminal Court for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) did not require that the determination of proportionali-
ty be subjective when it held: “In determining whether an attack was pro-
portionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed 
person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable 
use of the information available to him or her, could have expected exces-
sive civilian casualties to result from the attack.”109 This is due to the fact 
that it tries individual human beings and not, as Human Rights Watch ar-
gues, because a proportionality evaluation requires “psychological process-
es in human judgment.”110 To the contrary, the ICTY formula attempts to 
liberate the evaluation from the purely subjective judgment of the attacker 
(which must nevertheless be taken into account when assessing his or her 
mens rea). 
D. Autonomous Weapons make Additional Precautions Possible 
 
Precautions in attack, in particular those listed in Article 57 of Protocol I, 
must be taken only if they are feasible. Obviously, whether a certain pre-
cautionary measure is feasible has to be measured against the alternatives 
available to those who plan and decide upon an attack or who execute it, 
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and not against the possibility for a machine to take a certain measure. 
Conversely, however, an autonomous weapon could be a means to render 
certain precautions, which would not be available to a soldier, feasible.111 
Because the human life of the pilot or weapons operator is not at risk, us-
ing autonomous weapons may result in the ability to take additional precau-
tions. “Robots can thus act ‘conservatively’ and ‘can shoot second.’ More-
over, powerful sensors and processing powers . . . can potentially lift the 
fog of war for human soldiers . . . thus save lives.”112 Obviously, this ad-
vantage is reduced if the enemy is prepared to defend against robot attacks.  
Those who produce robots will then program them to shoot first to avoid 
being destroyed by anti-robot weapons. We are then back to the classical 
situation in warfare. 
Intelligent weapons have an additional advantage. The feasibility of 
precautions evolves through experience. When precautions taken in the 
past proved unsuccessful, that may imply the need to learn lessons (and 
belligerents have, in my view, an obligation to foresee pertinent proce-
dures) to avoid such incidents in the future. If artificial intelligence can be 
created, it is essential to make sure that weapons with such intelligence can 
be recalled and reprogrammed, and that human beings monitor the devel-
opment of that intelligence in order to quickly take advantage of lessons 
learned. 
A legal issue arising is that important precautions, such as the obliga-
tions to verify the nature of the target and the lawfulness of the attack, to 
choose means and methods avoiding or minimizing incidental effects on 
civilians and to respect the proportionality principle, are addressed by Arti-
cle 57(2)(a) of Protocol I only to “those who plan or decide upon an at-
tack.” Some wonder whether this means that a human being must plan and 
decide to conduct the attack.113 As discussed above, in my view, all rules of 
IHL are addressed only to human beings. This does not, however, preclude 
human planners and decision makers from being temporally and geograph-
ically removed from the attack, as long as they define the parameters ac-
cording to which the robot attacks, make sure that it complies with them 
and has the necessary information to apply such parameters. 
A major problem in terms of precautions is the obligation to cancel or 
suspend an attack 
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if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject 
to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause inci-
dental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or 
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated.114  
 
Does this mean because an autonomous weapon is used and no human 
perceives the change in circumstances that the rule cannot, therefore, be 
violated?115 In my view, the State’s obligation to ensure that commanders 
do everything feasible to verify the lawfulness of targets implies that weap-
on systems must be designed to allow such verification—either through the 
system itself or by a human. Even those who favor lethal autonomous 
weapons do not seem confident that such weapons could be intelligent 
enough for it to become apparent to them that an attack is unlawful. They 
therefore suggest that there should be “some version of a human over-
ride.”116 This may, however, raise the problem that machines process in-
formation so quickly based upon such a vast store of information that a 
human will be unable to really comprehend, evaluate and, if necessary, in-
terrupt the machine’s operation.117 In addition, humans will have a tenden-
cy to trust the computer and hesitate to override it, as the example of USS 
Vincennes shooting down Iran Air Flight 655 demonstrated. Finally, com-
munications between the human who is supposed to conduct the override 
and the machine may be disrupted or manipulated by the enemy.118 It is my 
understanding, logically, if autonomous weapons are able to distinguish in 
the first place, they should be equally able to sense changes in their situa-
tional context and to cancel an attack if the given information indicates it is 
unlawful. If they are not able to distinguish in the first place, it would be 
inconsistent with IHL to deploy them autonomously.  
For attacks involving autonomous weapons, as for any other attack, 
greater transparency about the precautionary measures taken and those dis-
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carded as not feasible, would be highly desirable.119 In accordance with in-
ternational human rights law, States could also initiate inquiries, the out-
comes of which would be made public. Planning and decision making are 
by definition secret, and it is often impossible to determine what the com-
mander knew and what alternatives, if any, were available at the time of the 
attack. However, a higher degree of transparency after the fact would be 
useful for both the defendant and the prosecutor before an international or 
domestic court if criminal charges were brought. It would help prove the 
unlawfulness of certain behavior or, conversely, prove that IHL was re-
spected. Greater transparency would be particularly useful in setting forth 
the facts for events that unnecessarily make the headlines or are used for 
propaganda purposes. The credibility of IHL would in turn be reinforced. 
Hence, it is regrettable that States and military lawyers often refuse to even 
start discussing such proposals, perhaps in fear of potential criticism and 
criminal prosecution.120 The fact that operations by autonomous weapons 





I assume even autonomous weapon systems with artificial intelligence, 
though capable of learning, cannot do what the human beings who created 
them do not want them to do—or that it is at least possible to limit their 
autonomy in this regard. Such must be the case because they are not ad-
dressees of the law. If this is true, I cannot exclude that it may one day be 
possible to construct autonomous weapon systems which are capable of 
perceiving the information necessary to comply with IHL (this appears to 
me as the main challenge moving forward) and then to apply IHL to that 
information. For the time being, and pending evidence of revolutionary 
technical developments, it may be wise to limit the use of autonomous 
weapons to situations in which no proportionality assessment is needed 
and where the enemy consists of forces declared hostile in high-intensity 
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conflicts. I believe it will still take time before they can be used in counter-
insurgency operations. However, the IHL on targeting does not require 
subjective value judgments that machines are unable to make, but depends 
on an objective assessment of facts.  
If my two technical assumptions and my understanding of IHL are cor-
rect, an attack executed by autonomous weapons would have many ad-
vantages in terms of distinction, proportionality and precautions over an 
attack directly executed by human beings. The development of autono-
mous weapons may even lead, because of programming needs, to a clarifi-
cation of many rules that have so far remained vague and whose protective 
utility currently depends upon subjective value judgments. Most arguments 
of principle against autonomous weapons either do not withstand compari-
son with other means and methods of warfare—although the risk of pro-
liferation has to be taken very seriously in this case—or they are based up-
on an erroneous understanding of IHL.  
There are, nevertheless, challenges when applying existing IHL to au-
tonomous weapons which necessitate agreement on the proper interpreta-
tion of IHL by every State using them and between States. As with all 
weapons, users must be appropriately trained and subject to accountability 
mechanisms, which requires that autonomous weapon systems keep rec-
ords. Accountability must, however, equally apply to the producers. Such a 
requirement of accountability implies the need for agreed professional 
standards, but also that lawyers agree on the temporal field of application 
of IHL and the application of international criminal law to conduct occur-
ring in peacetime which produces results during armed conflict. 
In addition, in an environment in which the proportionality principle 
must be applied—and theoretically even to determine what is a military 
objective—autonomous weapon systems must be constantly updated on 
the plans and progress of operations to enable them to evaluate whether a 
definite military advantage can be anticipated to result from the attack and 
whether the risks for the civilian population are excessive compared with 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
Finally, parameters must be established for comparing the performance 
of autonomous weapon systems with that of human beings in carrying out 
attacks. The feasibility of precautions must be understood to refer to what 
would be feasible for human beings employing the machine, not to the 
possibilities available to the machine. A particularly tricky issue is to deter-
mine, in case autonomous weapons are used, the meaning of the obligation 












This implies that autonomous weapons possess sensing capability and abil-
ity to change behavior. 
It is to be hoped that these issues will be discussed in the forthcoming 
experts’ and States’ meetings addressing the possible need for new rules on 
autonomous weapons. 
 
